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ABSTRACT 
Can ownership status influence probability judgments under condition of uncertainty? In 
three experiments, we presented our participants with a recording of a real horse race. We 
endowed half of our sample with a wager on a single horse to win the race, and the other half 
with money to spend to acquire the same wager. As the race progressed, participants were 
asked to update their buying or selling prices, and to estimate the probability that a given 
horse will win the race. Across three large studies (N = 750), we found the endowment effect 
– owners demanded significantly more for the wager than buyers were willing to pay to 
acquire it. However, we also found that probability estimates of each horse winning the race 
did not differ between owners and non-owners of the betting slip, despite the fact that the 
only information participants should use to inform their valuation is the strength of their 
belief that each horse will win the race. Our results demonstrate that distorted perception of 
probability is unlikely to be a mechanism explaining the endowment effect. 
Keywords: endowment effect, loss aversion, betting, valuation, probability estimation 
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One of the most robust and widely-reported anomalies in behavioural economics is a pattern 
of preferences called the endowment effect, whereby people require more compensation to 
give up an object than they will pay to acquire it (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; 
Thaler, 1980). This asymmetry is apparent in studies where sellers’ (owners) willingness-to-
accept (WTA) is systematically found to be much higher than buyers’ (non-owners) 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the same product. The effect is often explained using prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): the valuation disparity arises as a consequence of loss 
aversion from the perspective of the owner of the object, with losses being weighted more 
heavily than gains. Since loss aversion offers a purely descriptive account of the endowment 
effect, a number of efforts have been directed at explaining the cognitive and affective 
processes that may produce the WTA-WTP gap (Ariely, Huber, & Wertenbroch, 2005; Gal, 
2006). A large proportion of this work focused on the comparison between owners’ and non-
owners’ behavior for goods that are risky, such as monetary gambles or lottery tickets (see 
Yechiam, Ashby, & Pachur, 2017 for a recent meta-analysis).  
One possible cause for the endowment effect under conditions of risk and uncertainty, 
which has been largely overlooked in the past literature, is that owners may overestimate the 
value of a possession due to a distorted perception of the probability with which a given 
object will bring a positive return (Okada, 2010; Walasek, Wright, & Rakow, 2014). 
Consider one of the most striking demonstrations of the endowment effect in risky choice – 
the unwillingness to trade lottery tickets (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1996; Risen & Gilovich, 2007). 
One ticket in a random draw lottery is just as valuable as any other ticket and yet participants 
have shown reluctance to trade with each other, even if the exchange brings additional 
monetary reward and the transaction costs are minimal. When Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996) 
asked their participants to state the probability that a held ticket would be the winning one, 
the probabilities did not exceed the actual odds given by the lottery’s structure. In the context 
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of such a transparent lottery, it should not be surprising that participants were able to simply 
report the objective probability of winning. However, this method cannot fully discount the 
possibility that participants’ personal beliefs about their chance of winning were distorted by 
their ownership status. 
In order to explore whether ownership status can distort probability estimates, we now 
turn to goods of uncertain value, for which the probabilities associated with outcomes are 
unknown to the decision maker. To investigate whether probability judgments can be 
distorted by the ownership status, we use horse racing as the context for our experiments. 
Horse races represent a good example of dynamic uncertainty experienced in the environment 
where probabilities associated with the different outcomes are often unknown. Before a race 
begins, bettors must integrate their prior beliefs, without any evidence from the present race, 
to decide which horse to bet on. As the race progresses, more information is available that 
can be used to update observers’ beliefs. In the following three experiments, we endowed half 
of our sample with a wager on a single horse winning the race, and the other half with money 
to spend to acquire the same wager. As the race progressed and new information about the 
competitors was accumulated, participants were asked to update their buying or selling 
prices, and to estimate the probability that a given horse will win the race.  
This unique experimental design allows us to test three possible effects of ownership 
status on stated probability judgments. First, it is possible that ownership status alone can be 
a source of bias in probability estimates. For example, participants who own a bet may 
believe that giving up their ticket “tempts fate” and increases the chance of a negative event 
occurring (Durand, Emhoff, Frey, Shea, & Holmes, 2015; Risen & Gilovich, 2007, 2008). 
However, we should also expect that the differences between owners and non-owners in 
probability estimates and valuation reduce as the race progresses and the uncertainty 
associated with the competing horses decreases (cf. Okada, 2010; Walasek et al., 2014). The 
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additional information about horses’ performance should correct, at least in part, any 
misperception formed at the point when ownership of the bet was the only basis for forming a 
prediction about the race results. Second, an alternative prediction is that the size of the 
endowment effect and the discrepancy in probability judgments will increase as more 
information about the race is accrued. This prediction is based on the growing evidence that 
the WTA-WTP gap reflects differences in information-processing, which involve 
mechanisms of attention allocation (Carmon & Ariely, 2000), memory retrieval (Johnson, 
Häubl, & Keinan, 2007), or pre-decisional information search (Pachur & Scheibehenne, 
2012). According to these accounts, ownership status leads to a biased evaluation of the 
product, elevating its value for owners but suppressing it for buyers  (Morewedge & Giblin, 
2015; Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005). While our study does not aim to discern between 
these individual process-based mechanisms, we predict that continuous and biased 
information processing can enlarge differences in the probability estimates between owners 
and non-owners. The third possibility is that there are no differences in the probability 
estimates of owners and non-owners, and that the (mis)perception of probability does not 
contribute to the size of the WTA-WTP gap. Here we summarize the three predictions in the 
form of competing hypotheses about the role of ownership status in probability judgments 
under condition of uncertainty: 
H1: Ownership status is a source of bias in probability judgments when no diagnostic 
information is available. The bias should reduce as more information is accumulated, leading 
to a reduction of the endowment effect.  
H2: Ownership status is a source of bias in information processing. As a result, the 
endowment effect should increase as more information is accumulated. 
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H3: Ownership status does not influence probability estimates and the endowment 
effect can arise in the absence of any distortions in people’s judgments. 
Experiment 1a 
Method 
Design and Materials 
Participants were assigned to the group of owners or non-owners of a virtual betting 
slip for a wager on a particular horse (Severina). This bet could return $2.00 if Severina won 
the race, but nothing if the horse did not finish first. Instead of a betting slip, non-owners 
were given an additional $1.00 which they could use to purchase the wager. The field of eight 
horses was narrowed for wagering purposes to two, which were identified as being among the 
top four finishing horses. Unbeknownst to the participants, the two horses were in fact the 
first (Severina) and second-place (Happy Daze) finishers. Race footage was taken from the 
Lagoon Games package (Race 1 from Lagoon Handicap Hurdle; two miles and one furlong) 
with audio commentary muted; participants had no prior odds information. An online survey 
system (Qualtrics; www.qualtrics.com) controlled the display and timing of the video 
playback and questions. 
 We divided the race footage into three blocks in order to capture different beliefs 
about the probability of Severina and Happy Daze winning the race. At the beginning of each 
block participants had a chance to either buy or sell the wager by specifying their WTP or 
WTA, respectively. On the next screen, each participant was also asked to indicate the 
probability of the two horses winning the race. The first valuation and probability estimation 
occurred when horses were still at the starting gates. At this point, each horse was equally 
likely to win, as there was no prior information available to suggest otherwise. Between 
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blocks 1 and 2 Happy Daze and Severina were tied and in the lead, but with half of the 
distance still ahead of them. Block 2 ended just before the finishing line, with Happy Daze in 
the lead and Severina in 5th position. 
Participants 
A sample of 286 participants from the USA was obtained via the online platform 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com). When responses originated from the 
same IP address, only the earlier submission was retained, unless the two overlapped in time. 
Data from participants failing to answer every question were deleted. We also removed 
participants who did not provide correct valuation responses in the pricing task (e.g., 
switched multiple times in the price list). The final sample used in the analysis included 229 
responses. Each individual received at least $0.50 for taking part in the study, which took 
approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed that they were going 
to watch a video recording of a horse race. They were then given either a $1.00 bet which 
would return $2.00 if Severina won the race, or $1.00 that could be used to obtain this wager. 
Both owners and non-owners were informed that at three points during the horse race, they 
would have the opportunity to choose between acquiring (selling) the bet and different 
amounts of money. This opportunity came at the beginning of each block: just before the start 
of the race (block 1), halfway through the race (block 2) and just before the finish line (block 
3). The buying and selling task applied the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak incentive compatible 
method (BDM; Becker, DeGroot & Marschak, 1964). As it was explained to the participants, 
a random market price would be drawn at the end of the experiment to determine whether 
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participants purchased or sold the wager. The market value could be compared to any of the 
three valuations made during the experiment. 
In addition to the valuation questions, participants were also asked about the 
probability that Happy Daze and Severina would win the race. Responses for each horse were 
recorded separately using two sliders that did not need to add up to 100 percent. Probability 
judgments were always collected at the end of each block (1, 2 and 3) but always after 
valuation questions. When the race finished, a random market price for the wager was 
generated to determine final ownership of the wager. Those who ended up with a bet were 
paid $2.50 ($0.50 participation fee + $2.00 winnings) minus the amount of money they spent 
in order to acquire the wager (buyers only). Individuals who ended up not owning the wager 
received a $0.50 participation fee plus either $1.00 (buyers only) or the amount they sold the 
wager for (sellers only).3   
Results 
A summary of owners’ and non-owners’ valuations across three stages of the race is 
presented in the top left panel of Figure 1. 
*** Insert Figure 1 About Here *** 
From the plot, it is clear that owners asked for more money for the wager than buyers were 
willing to pay for it, demonstrating the classic endowment effect. Furthermore, although 
valuations visibly drop from block 2 to 3, the WTA-WTP disparity remains stable across all 
three time points. Consistent with the events in the race, valuations of the wager are close to 
$1.00 when horses are still at the starting line (block 1) and when they are tied halfway 
                                                          
3 At the end of the experiment we also collected responses on the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) to 
test an auxiliary hypothesis. However, the majority of respondents indicated that they were familiar with the 
task, making these data unusable. 
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through the race (block 2). However, the value of the wager on Severina drops considerably 
when the horse is in the 5th position, just before the end of the race. 
 We analysed the valuation data for all three blocks simultaneously using linear mixed 
effect modeling (with lme R package; http://www.R-project.org/). The model included a 
random effect of participant and fixed effects for the ownership status and block (and their 
interaction). Summary of the results for valuation are shown in the top panel of Table 1. The 
corresponding p-values were calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation (lmerTest 
package in R, Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2014). 
*** Insert Table 1 About Here *** 
The results confirm that there is a significant endowment effect. Also, valuations drop 
significantly in block 3, just before the end of the race. From the lack of interaction with time 
at which valuation was made we can conclude that the size of the gap was relatively constant 
throughout the race. Indeed, owners demanded 22.4%, 21.6% and 25.0% more than non-
owners, at each consecutive time point of the race. In comparison to other studies that used 
risky (but not uncertain) objects, our endowment effect was smaller than the median ratio of 
1.52 found in a recent meta-analysis (Yechiam et al., 2017).  
 The probability judgments for both Severina and Happy Daze reveal that owners and 
non-owners of the wager shared approximately the same beliefs about the odds of the two 
horses winning the race. The surprising lack of any disparity is apparent in both left and right 
panels in the top part of Figure 2. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
*** Insert Figure 2 About Here *** 
Overall, whereas probability estimates varied throughout the race, the sum of the aggregate 
estimates is close to 100% in each block. Naturally, we would not expect the sum to always 
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be this high since Severina and Happy Daze were not the only horses involved in the race and 
participants were explicitly told that these two horses were among the top four finishers. We 
return to this issue in our general discussion. Notably, however, probability estimates appear 
to reflect relative changes in valuations that we can observe in Figure 1. 
We used mixed effect modelling to predict probability judgments at block 1, 2 and 3 
for each horse separately. Surprisingly, the effect of ownership status is significant in case of 
Happy Daze (bottom section of the Table 1) although it is clear from Figure 2 that the only 
evident difference occurs at the beginning of block 1 (but note that the interaction effect is 
not significant with p-values of .065 and .093). It therefore seems that while owners and non-
owners were in agreement regarding the chances of Severina winning, their beliefs about 
Happy Daze may have differed marginally. Notably, compared to owners, non-owners tend 
to overestimate the probability that Happy Daze will win the race, which is hard to reconcile 
with the valuation data where the size of the endowment effect remained relatively stable in 
all three blocks.  
Experiment 1b 
The results of the Experiment 1a are surprising in that we find strong evidence for the 
endowment effect in the absence of differences in the subjective probability judgments 
between owners and non-owners of a wager. In order to determine whether these effects are 
robust, we conducted a replication study with a new sample of participants. In Experiment 1a, 
participants were always asked to value the wager before providing probability estimates. In 
Experiment 1b, we reversed the order of these questions, always asking our participants about 
the probability of each horse winning the race first. 
Method 
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Design and Materials 
Design and Materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1a. 
Participants 
We recruited 300 participants from the USA using MTurk. In Experiment 1b, we 
increased the base payment to $0.75. We used the same screening criteria as in Experiment 
1a (16 removed) but additionally asked our participants if they have encountered any 
technical problems or have taken part in a similar study before (i.e. study with videos of horse 
races). Only one participant had an issue with the videos loading correctly and was excluded 
from the analysis. Our final sample included 283 responses.  
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1a with one exception. In the current 
study, participants were always asked to provide their probability estimates immediately after 
watching a video and before they could determine WTP or WTA for the wager. 
Results 
The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the presence of the endowment effect in all 
three blocks of the horse race, which is consistent with the results of Experiment 1a. Owners 
of the bet demanded 28.1%, 31.1% and 28.6% more than non-owners in blocks 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively. Middle left panel of Figure 2 demonstrates that probability judgments for 
Severina winning the race were not different between owners and non-owners. For Happy 
Daze, on the other hand, we find that non-owners gave higher probability estimates than 
owners in all three blocks of the race. This interpretation is confirmed by the results of two 
regression analyses which are reported in the right column of Table 1. As in Experiment 1a, 
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the main effect of Ownership status is significant for the probability estimates of Happy Daze 
winning the race (bottom part of Table 1).   
Overall, we find a clear WTA-WTP gap in valuation in the context of horse racing. At 
the same time, we do not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that this disparity is driven 
by a difference in beliefs about the odds of each horse winning the race. Consequently, we do 
not find that distortions of probability estimates (and valuation gaps) decrease (Hypothesis 1) 
or increase (Hypothesis 2) as the race goes on. Instead, we find further support for our 
Hypothesis 3 according to which ownership status does not impact probability judgments. 
Experiment 2 
One interpretation of the findings presented so far is that ownership status does not 
influence buyers’ and sellers’ probability estimates, and therefore cannot explain the 
observed endowment effect. Another possibility is that our measure of bettors’ beliefs was 
not sensitive enough to identify differences between owners and non-owners of the wager. In 
fact, our measure was limiting in that it only allowed for a single point estimate for each of 
the two horses. It seems more plausible, however, that individual beliefs take a form of a 
distribution over some probability space, which simply reflects varying strength with which a 
given belief is held. In order to address potential limitation of our measurement, we elicited 
people’s probability estimates in the form of distributions over a range of probabilities in 
Experiment 2. In other words, we gave our participants an opportunity to express their 
confidence in their estimates of probabilities that the horses Severina and Happy Daze will 
win the race. 
 Obtaining people’s judgments as belief distribution allows us to test more precisely 
how ownership status influences people’s probability estimates. First, it is possible that 
owners and non-owners differ in how confident they are in their probability judgments. Some 
  Endowment effect 
 
13 
 
authors have argued that the prospect of losing owned possession motivates sellers to devote 
more cognitive resources to the task at hand. Indeed, it has been argued that the differences in 
cognitive effort and motivation between owners and non-owners may explain valuation gaps 
(Yechiam & Hochman, 2013). The second possibility is that owners and non-owners may 
differ in the amount of skew in their belief distributions. That is, while their mean judgment 
could be the same, owners may be nonetheless biased towards higher estimates while non-
owners may be biased towards lower estimates. We therefore use skewness scores as a more 
sensitive measure for detecting biased representation of an object that could in part be 
responsible for the emergence of the endowment effect. 
Method 
Design and Materials 
Design and Materials were identical to Experiment 1a, with only one key difference. 
In Experiment 2, we used DistributionBuilder tool (Andre, 2016) to collect our participants’ 
subjective judgments that a given horse will win the race. This method was originally 
introduced by (Sharpe, Goldstein, & Blythe, 2000) and was subsequently employed to study 
people’s subjective probabilities and confidence judgments (Goldstein, Johnson, & Sharpe, 
2008). The tool permits participants to indicate their response by assigning tokens to 
individual bins that represent some chosen quantity. In the present study, we used 11 bins that 
ranged from 0% to 100% in 10% intervals. Each participant had 10 tokens to distribute such 
that their assignment reflected their confidence in the exact probability that a given horse 
would win the race. The maximum number of tokens that could be assigned to any individual 
bin was set to 10. 
Participants 
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We recruited 332 participants from MTurk. The base payment for this study was set 
to $0.75. In addition to the exclusion criteria used in Experiment 1b, we also removed 
responses of participants who failed to complete our new distribution elicitation questions. 
Our final sample size included 238 responses. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1a with the exception of the new 
probability estimation questions replacing the probability point estimate questions used in the 
previous two experiments. We adapted our instructions and showed participants a screenshot 
of a distribution builder tool. Participants were asked to distribute all 10 tokens between the 
available bins. They were also informed that the more confident they are in a given 
probability, the more tokens they should assign to it. 
Results 
 Mean valuations of owners and non-owners are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 
1. Results are highly consistent with Experiment 1a and 1b, which is further confirmed by the 
regression analyses (see Table 2). As before, we find a significant effect of ownership 
(owners demanding 39.4%, 44.6% and 37.4% more than non-owners blocks 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively), and that valuations are lower in block 3 than in block 1. 
*** Insert Table 2 About Here *** 
 In order to compare probability estimates, we first computed a modal response given 
by the participants in the distribution builder task. We simply computed the weighted average 
based on the tokens that people assigned to different probability bins. The results are plotted 
in the bottom panel of Figure 2. Visibly, the pattern of results is consistent with our previous 
findings, despite using a rather different methodology to elicit people’s probability estimates. 
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First, while we find that probability judgments follow the events of the race, there are no 
differences between owners and non-owners in judged probability of Severina winning the 
race. In the case of Happy Daze, the effect of ownership is also absent. These conclusions 
align with the results of our regression analyses, which are reported in Table 3. 
*** Insert Table 3 About Here *** 
 The use of distribution builder allows us to explore two further features of the elicited 
beliefs. First, we computed the confidence of people’s judgments, by calculating the standard 
deviation of people’s responses. Table 3 summarizes results of the regression analysis, which 
tells us that standard deviation was lower in Blocks 2 and 3 compared to Block 1. However, 
buyers and sellers did not differ in terms of the confidence with which they judged the 
probability of each horse winning the race. Next, we computed skewness scores among our 
participants. One possibility is that owners are biased towards high estimates, while non-
owners are biased towards low estimates, even if their modal responses are the same. We 
computed skewness statistic for each participant’s responses (package e1071; Joanes & Gill, 
1998). The score of 0 represents a perfectly symmetrical distribution. Regression results in 
Table 3 show that, once more, we find no differences between owners and non-owners. In 
other words, ownership of the wager did not lead owners and non-owners to be biased 
towards higher and lower estimates, respectively. Both standard deviations and skewness 
scores are plotted in Figure 3. 
*** Insert Figure 3 About Here *** 
General Discussion 
Our results show that ownership status does not influence probability judgments 
under condition of uncertainty. Consistent with the endowment effect literature, we found 
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that people endowed with a wager demanded more money in exchange for it than buyers 
were willing to pay for it. As the race progressed and new information about the horses was 
accumulated by the participants, the valuation gap remained constant. Finally, perceived 
probability of each horse winning the race did not differ between owners and non-owners of 
the betting slip. Thus, although owners overvalued their wager on Severina, they did not 
think that this horse was more likely to win, or that the challenger (Happy Daze) was less 
likely to succeed. This is surprising since the only information participants should use to 
inform their valuation is the strength of their belief that each horse will win the race. 
 To the best of our knowledge we are the first to show how the endowment effect 
evolves across time in a realistic setting, with accumulation of new evidence under conditions 
of uncertainty. Our design allowed us to explore three unique stages of belief formation. At 
the beginning of the race, we observed equal probability estimates of owners and non-owners 
when no prior information about the horses was available. At the end of the first block, 
participants had a chance to evaluate both horses when they were tied. Despite the fact that 
everyone was free to evaluate the horses’ performance throughout the race, the probability 
judgments of the two groups did not diverge. In the final stage, the poor performance of 
Severina is reflected in probability judgments, although once again, the perception is the 
same among owners and non-owners of the betting slip. Clearly, perception of probability 
was unrelated to the size of the endowment effect. 
 We observed some differences in judged probability of Happy Daze winning the race. 
In Experiment 1a, buyers’ estimates were higher before the race began, and in Experiment 1b 
buyers’ estimates were slightly higher in all three blocks of the race. In Experiment 2, on the 
other hand, there were no differences between owners and non-owners at any point in the 
race. The observed distortions were generally too small (~3%) to be able to explain the robust 
endowment effect that was found in all blocks in all three experiments.  
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 While probability estimates generally followed events of the race and reflected 
people’s valuations, we also observed that estimates were generally very high. More 
specifically, since participants were informed that Severina and Happy Daze are among top 
four finishers, it is surprising that probability estimates for the two target horses often 
summed up to 100%. It therefore appears that our participants ignored the fact that other 
horses could also win the race. One possible explanation for this result is that our instructions 
and experimental design reinforced individuals’ belief that the winner must be either Severina 
or Happy Daze. Nonetheless, there is no apparent reason why this could obscure our main 
finding that the estimates of probability are the same for owners and non-owners of the 
betting slip. 
Since we did not find that distorted probability judgments accounted for the endowment 
effect, it is likely that other mechanisms are responsible for the WTA-WTP disparity in our 
experiment. One obvious candidate is regret aversion (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1996; Kogler, 
Kühberger, & Gilhofer, 2013; Ratan, 2013; Risen & Gilovich, 2008). Anticipated feelings of 
regret associated with giving up a winning bet or wasting money on an unsuccessful one has 
been shown to be a strong contributor to the endowment effect. For example, Ratan, (2013) 
demonstrated that when holders of a lottery tickets can reverse their decision to sell or keep 
their endowment, they are more likely to trade. Similarly, inducing feelings of regret 
(Martinez, Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011) or making them less vivid (Maimaran, 2011), 
reduce the under trading in lottery tasks. Although some have suggested that misperception of 
probability might contribute to the WTA-WTP disparity alongside feelings of regret, our 
results suggest that this is an unlikely scenario. In line with the work of Walasek et al. (2014), 
we find that the perception of probability does not seem to explain the endowment effect. 
However, in contrast to their findings, we did not observe that the endowment effect 
decreases in magnitude as the uncertainty about the value of a risky asset decreases. 
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Our results, together with those reported by Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996; also Walasek 
et al., 2014), show that a difference in valuation between owners and non-owners for objects 
of risky or uncertain value can arise even when these two groups do not differ in their 
perception of probability associated with these goods/assets. Despite this, plenty of empirical 
evidence shows that owners and non-owners differ in their evaluation of an object, in both 
risky and riskless contexts. For example, Johnson, Häubl and Keinan (2007) argued that 
perspective (i.e., being a buyer vs. a seller) influences internal information search when 
people generate valuations of goods. The process is explained by Query Theory (QT; Weber 
& Johnson, 2006), which posits that buyers and sellers retrieve information about the value of 
goods based on their current status quo. Specifically, buyers initially retrieve information that 
decreases the value of a prospective purchase, while sellers tend to first recall features that 
enhance the value of their asset/possession. Several studies (e.g., Johnson et al., 2007) found 
support for QT’s predictions with differences in information retrieval being shown to mediate 
the endowment effects. According to these accounts, the top-down effect of ownership status 
influences attention allocation to positive and negative attributes of a good (Ashby, Dickert, 
& Glockner, 2012; Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Nayakankuppam & Mishra, 2005). Lastly, 
ownership status also appears to influence the pre-decisional information search. Pachur and 
Scheibehenne (2012) found that when probabilities and outcomes of gambles are not known 
to the participants, but this information can be acquired by repeatedly sampling from different 
alternatives, the stopping rule of this search differs as a function of ownership status. In their 
study, owners were more likely to stop their information search after encountering a positive 
outcome, whereas buyers were more likely to stop having seen a negative outcome. The 
authors showed that these differences predicted the size of the endowment effect in their 
study.  
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The accounts summarized above suggest that owners and non-owners form a biased 
representation of an object, which gives rise to the WTA-WTP disparity. Our results suggest 
that the endowment effect can occur even if owners and non-owners share the same 
perception of how profitable an uncertain asset is. In explaining the endowment effect, 
further studies are needed to address the apparent discordance between different process level 
measurements, valuation, and evaluative judgments. 
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Table 1. The effect of ownership status and block on valuation and probability judgments. 
  Experiment 1a Experiment 1b 
  Est. SE t p Est. SE t p 
Valuation Intercept 0.89 0.04 22.70 < .001 0.85 0.04 22.88 <.001 
 Ownership 0.20 0.06 3.47 < .001 0.24 0.05 4.44 <.001 
 Block 2 0.04 0.04 1.25 .213 0.04 0.03 1.37 .172 
 Block 3 -0.25 0.04 -6.90 <. 001 -0.16 0.03 -6.03 <.001 
 
Ownership 
* Block 2 
<0.01 0.05 0.05 .962 0.04 0.04 0.88 .380 
 
Ownership 
* Block 3 
-0.04 0.05 -0.73 .466 -0.04 0.04 -0.93 .354 
  Pseudo R2 = .758 Pseudo R2 = .828 
p(Severina 
wins) 
Intercept 60.37 1.75 34.25 < .001 56.61 1.64 34.55 <.001 
 Ownership -0.29 2.57 -0.12 .909 1.60 2.36 0.68 .499 
 Block 1 3.41 2.13 1.60 .110 10.82 1.84 5.90 <.001 
 Block 2 -19.20 2.13 -9.01 < .001 -16.39 1.84 -8.93 <.001 
 
Ownership 
* Block 2 
0.66 3.12 0.21 .834 0.24 2.65 0.09 .927 
 
Ownership 
* Block 3 
-0.82 3.12 -0.26 .792 -0.89 2.65 -0.33 .740 
  Pseudo R2 = .553 Pseudo R2 = .653 
p(Happy 
Daze wins) 
Intercept 54.77 1.59 34.70 < .001 53.99 1.52 35.54 <.001 
 Ownership -5.12 2.31 -2.22 .027 -5.19 2.19 -2.37 .018 
 Block 1 4.58 1.82 2.52 .012 4.96 1.81 2.74 .006 
 Block 2 19.42 1.82 10.67 < .001 20.52 1.81 11.34 <.001 
 
Ownership 
* Block 2 
4.93 2.66 1.85 .065 1.34 2.61 .51 .609 
 
Ownership 
* Block 3 
4.49 2.66 1.69 .093 2.92 2.61 1.12 .263 
  Pseudo R2 = .611 Pseudo R2 = .574 
Note. For the fixed effect of ownership, sellers are used as a reference point. “Est.” stands for the non-
standardized beta coefficient. 
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Table 2. The effect of ownership status and block on valuation in Experiment 2. 
 Est. SE t p 
Intercept 0.72 0.03 22.43 <.001 
Ownership 0.28 0.05 6.22 <.001 
Block 2 0.03 0.03 1.16 .248 
Block 3 -0.10 0.03 -3.85 <.001 
Ownership * Block 2 0.05 0.04 1.36 .175 
Ownership * Block 3 -0.05 0.04 -1.39 .165 
 Pseudo R2 = .807 
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Table 3. The effect of ownership status and block on valuation and probability judgments in 
Experiment 2. 
  Severina Happy Daze 
  Est. SE t p Est. SE t p 
Modal Prob. 
Estimate 
Intercept 52.60 1.72 30.62 <.001 46.86 1.58 29.68 <.001 
 Ownership 1.30 2.44 0.53 .595 -3.05 2.24 -1.36 .174 
 Block 2 4.81 1.67 2.88 .004 0.78 2.24 0.48 .633 
 Block 3 -13.13 1.77 -7.85 <.001 17.43 1.62 10.76 <.001 
 
Ownership 
* Block 2 
1.77 2.38 0.74 .457 3.45 2.30 1.50 .135 
 
Ownership 
* Block 3 
1.68 2.38 0.71 .481 3.00 2.30 1.30 .193 
  Pseudo R2 = .719 Pseudo R2 = .701 
St. Dev. Intercept 8.99 0.62 14.44 <.001 9.27 0.63 14.73 <.001 
 Ownership 0.23 0.88 -0.26 .797 0.20 0.89 0.22 .825 
 Block 1 -1.86 0.58 -3.20 .001 -2.35 0.60 -3.76 <.001 
 Block 2 -1.66 0.58 -2.84 .005 -2.33 0.60 -3.90 <.001 
 
Ownership 
* Block 2 
-0.65 0.83 -0.79 .431 -0.19 0.85 -0.23 .819 
 
Ownership 
* Block 3 
-0.59 0.83 -0.72 .473 -0.02 0.85 -0.03 .979 
  Pseudo R2 = .713 Pseudo R2 = .705 
Skewness Intercept -0.12 0.05 -2.41 .016 -0.06 0.05 -1.14 .257 
 Ownership 0.06 0.07 0.81 .421 0.04 0.08 0.53 .597 
 Block 1 0.10 0.07 1.34 .183 0.08 0.07 1.11 .270 
 Block 2 0.21 0.07 3.09 .002 -0.09 0.07 -1.19 .236 
 
Ownership 
* Block 2 
-0.08 0.10 -0.80 .425 -0.07 0.11 -0.67 .506 
 
Ownership 
* Block 3 
-0.15 0.10 -1.61 .109 0.02 0.11 0.24 .815 
  Pseudo R2 = .306 Pseudo R2 = .047 
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Figure 1. Mean valuations of buyers and sellers of the bet for Severina to win the race at the 
beginning of each block. 
Figure 2. Probability estimates for Severina (left panel) and Happy Daze (right panel), for 
Experiments 1a, 1b and 2. 
Figure 3. Standard deviation (top panel) and skewness (bottom panel) of probability estimates 
for Severina (left panel) and Happy Daze (right panel) in Experiment 2. 
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Experiment 1a Experiment 1b 
  
Experiment 2 
 
Figure 1. Mean valuations of buyers and sellers of the bet for Severina to win the race at the 
beginning of each block. 
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Experiment 1a: Severina Experiment 1a: Happy Daze 
  
Experiment 1b: Severina Expriment 1b: Happy Daze 
  
Experiment 2: Severina Experiment 2: Happy Daze 
  
Figure 2. Probability estimates for Severina (left panel) and Happy Daze (right panel), for 
Experiments 1a, 1b and 2. 
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Experiment 2: Severina Experiment 2: Happy Daze 
  
Experiment 2: Severina Experiment 2: Happy Daze 
  
Figure 3. Standard deviation (top panel) and skewness (bottom panel) of probability estimates 
for Severina (left panel) and Happy Daze (right panel) in Experiment 2. 
 
 
